

Crime Risk Assessment: Mixed Use Development – 309 King Street Newcastle

Prepared for Graph Property Pty Ltd

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Executive Summary

CHD Partners (CHD) has prepared this report in response to a request from Wests Group Australia (Wests), for a crime risk assessment at Wests Newcastle and the development of mixed use development comprising of two towers over 14 levels incorporating residential aged care facility and independent living, residential apartments and commercial. The site is located at 309 King Street Newcastle West NSW (see Appendix 1 for an aerial photograph of the site).

The project team (see Appendix 2 for a brief profile of project team members) undertook numerous tasks in completing this crime risk assessment, including:

- Detailed analysis of site plans provided by Fender Katsalidis Architecture.
- Site visits to gain an understanding of the topography, location and monitor pedestrian and traffic movements adjacent to the site.
- Analysis of relevant crime data.
- Interviews (telephone and in person) with key stakeholders, including police, local government and client.
- Review of relevant documentation pertaining to the site and adjacent areas.

In completing this crime risk assessment, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the process. Firstly, building design and layout are only some of the potential ingredients of crime – they are not the only contributing factors. Consequently, treatment of design and layout will only ever be a partial solution to overall crime problems.

Secondly, aspects of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) are not necessarily fully explored at this point in the Development Application (DA) process. For example, space management is considered to play an important role in shaping the way a location is perceived and the nature of activities operating in (predominantly) public spaces. Detailed plans pertaining to space management are ordinarily not completed prior to the submission of the DA. Accordingly, any crime risk assessment must be considered as being limited by these factors.

Nonetheless, it is now well established that features of building design and layout can increase or decrease the likelihood of crime. For this reason, Local Governments have included Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) in their Local Development Control Plans to provide additional guidance to comply with Part 4 Division 4.3 Section 4.15 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 2017*. These guidelines specifically require consideration of the CPTED principles listed on the following page.

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Principle	Summary
Surveillance	Surveillance simply relates to others being able to see what is happening in a particular location. Lighting, shrubbery and foliage, buildings and other installations can promote or hinder surveillance. Creation of inviting spaces, installation of windows, lighting, deployment of guards and providing clear sightlines promote surveillance. Closed circuit television (CCTV) and other electronic means can also be used for surveillance.
Access control	The movement of people can be greatly affected by physical and symbolic barriers. Creating a small number of entrances, for example, increases opportunities for surveillance and reduces anonymity of visitors. Erecting fences and barriers, using landscaping techniques to encourage use of particular areas and biometric access measures are all examples of access control.
Territorial reinforcement	Simple cues in the built environment inform people about the nature of the environments that they routinely pass through and visit. A sign can denote movement from public to private space; conditions of entry can encourage particular behaviour and active maintenance can discourage illegal activities. Territorial reinforcement can be promoted by these and other measures.
Space management	The ongoing maintenance of an area will send cues to would-be offenders. If an area shows sign of damage and limited monitoring, then would-be offenders might be inclined to damage property or perpetrate crimes against the person, safe in the knowledge that they will not be apprehended. Maintaining property, listing conditions of entry, removing graffiti and repairing damage, all contribute to effective space management. Such strategies are routinely enacted post completion of a development.

Based on these principles and the analyses undertaken, there does not appear to be any likelihood that the proposed mixed-use development will adversely affect crime levels in the area. On the contrary, from analysis of the site plans, there are a number of features that will have a salutary impact on the area, including the likelihood of increased activation of the area through increases in vehicle traffic and population density through increased patronage maximising surveillance throughout the day. Both of these have the potential to minimise actual crime incidents as well as help alleviate fear of crime.

Beyond these positive impacts on the surrounding area, there are also features of the proposed mixed-use development which reflect CPTED principles and address potential crime risks. These include:

- The proposed mixed-use development has clear legibility and clear transition from private to semi-private space. The semi-private areas are distinct from public space which helps promote territoriality.
- Clear sightlines through the site and good visibility into the site generally.

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- No signs of entrapment spots and limited long blank walls that would contribute to crime in the area.
- Clearly demarcated parking for residents and visitors (vehicle and disabled) reducing potential excuse making for would be offenders.

While it is anticipated that these benefits will be derived from this mixed-use development there are some issues that might be considered throughout including:

- Given the existing steal of and steal from motor vehicle offences in the area, consideration might be given to erecting suitable signage around the development reminding car owners to secure their vehicles.
- Lighting in and around the development needs to be carefully planned such that
 it exceeds the AS 1158, thus increasing surveillance and promoting feelings of
 safety.
- Carefully planned landscaping to ensure plants and foliage to not obstruct sightlines and lighting.
- Use of signage and other physical cues to help people find their way around the facility easily.
- Development of space management strategies to include ongoing site maintenance, landscaping, graffiti removal etc.

Following the analysis of the site plans along with other documentation, such as crime statistics and consultations with Fender Katsalidis Architecture, local police and local government, it is concluded that the proposed development has the potential to positively contribute to the area.

The development will not compromise the existing security arrangements for The West's Newcastle Club due to its demographic. The Wests Newcastle also provides late night security within the curtilage of the development site that will improve safety / perceived level of safety for residents.

It is suggested that crime in the area is currently not a concern and the proposed plans for the site are likely to increase activity during the day, promote surveillance and provide good sightlines into and through the semi-private realm, thus further helping to contribute towards crime reduction and promote feelings of safety.

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Background

CHD has prepared this report in response to a request from Wests Group, for a crime risk assessment for a mixed-development at Wests Newcastle. The site is located at 309 King Street Newcastle West NSW (see Appendix 1 for an aerial photograph of the site).

The crime risk assessment will contribute to the DA that Wests will lodge to Newcastle City Council.

In preparing this crime risk assessment, consideration has been given to (amongst other things):

- Fender Katsalidis Architects plans.
- Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) Online Data Tools http://crimetool.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/bocsar/
- New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Newcastle *Local Government Area Crime Trends Report April 2013 to March 2018*.
- Newcastle City Council Safe City Plan 2017 2020
- Newcastle City Council Development Control Plan 2012 4.04 Safety and Security.
- Part 4 Division 4.3 Section 4.15 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 2017

The following outlines the processes adopted and findings of the crime risk assessment for the proposed refurbishment site.

1. Functional Site Analysis

The Wests Newcastle is located at 309 King Street, (boarded by King Street, Ravenshaw Street and Bull Street) Newcastle West NSW with access to the site from one driveway in King Street.

The existing facility is a car park area adjacent to the main club.

The manner in which the entire site relates to existing adjacent structures is important. There are residential houses located to the east to south east in Laman and Bull Street. To the north there is commercial buildings and the new light rail development. Located to the south are a mix of commercial and government office blocks. To the west is a mix of residential high rise, licensed venue and shopping centre complex. Surveillance will also be provided by patrons and members coming and going from the club will be beneficial to the existing area. The surrounding area is well maintained but with noticeable signs of graffiti on buildings and power poles within 300 metres.

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2. Functional Area Analysis

It is important that the proposed mixed development complements existing surrounds. The area has been going through a major transformation and the design trends that have been introduced, along with existing design features of the area have been taken into consideration in the design of the mixed development.

The different areas of the development including residential aged care facility, independent living, residential apartments and commercial (bar and café). This increases the active natural surveillance of the site and area reducing opportunities for crime. The addition of development will increase activity in an area of the venue that has limited natural surveillance due to existing parking structure.

Each area of the site plays an integral role in the overall functioning of the site. Importantly, each will contribute to activity and pedestrian movement in the area and each is likely to attract different patrons at different periods throughout the day and night.

Residential / **care facilities** – the residential facilities provide a spectrum of residential choice. One, two and three-bedroom apartments will ultimately be provided at the site. To function effectively, the residential areas will need to be accessible, secure, insulated against noise and the elements, provide suitable parking and provide comfort for residents.

Retail facilities – to function effectively, the retail facilities will need to provide suitable amenities (e.g. parking), enable easy access from surrounding transport options, complement other areas of the site and be managed appropriately to reduce any potential conflict between shoppers, residents and other users of the area. Consideration needs to be given to the types of retail businesses that will occupy the site in order to ensure the types of people attracted to the stores are in line with the overall functioning of the area and the surrounding areas.

Courtyard and Outdoor Feature – There are two areas of interest. The public through site link between the existing club and tower and the second link that runs through the Independent Living Courtyard.

The public through site link will be an important feature of the site and will be particularly important in drawing in passers-by to, not only use the space for relaxation and recreation purposes but also to attract people to the retail space and cafes within the complex. Ensuring the areas are activated, appropriate surveillance, well maintained and accessible to all, are critical elements to the good functioning of that space. Because of the nature of this area and opportunities for malicious damage and graffiti, as highlighted by Lisa Davis of Newcastle City Council "walls need to be constructed of robust materials and ensuring over the long term they looked loved and well presented. Anti-graffiti material should be used and not having a blank canvas.

The second link through the Independent Living Courtyard will be partially fenced and provide open space to the independent living units, while the southern end will provide access to the residential apartments.

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Commercial facilities – the site will also include commercial outlets augmenting the offer for patrons, visitors and residents. The mix of commercial outlets will stimulate activity and activate specific edges of the site.

3. Crime Analysis

The central source of crime data in New South Wales is BOCSAR. BOCSAR provides freely available crime data for local government areas (LGAs) across the state. This data can help to demonstrate crime trends.

Table 1, Selected Offences in the Newcastle LGA, details the number of criminal incidents which occurred between April 2013 and March 2018. Some offences (e.g. murder, manslaughter, specific robbery offences) are not detailed here due to their omission by BOCSAR in their 'Local Government Area Ranking Tool' online service.

Appendix 4 contains crime data for the Newcastle LGA for the 5-year period between April 2013 and April 2018. From this data, it is apparent that across this time period there has been a decline or little change in key crime categories.

Table 1. Recorded incidents of selected offences in the Newcastle Local Government Area Annual totals and 60-month trend from April 2013 to March 2018

Offence	Apr 2013 to Mar 2014	Apr 2014 to Mar 2015	Apr 2015 to Mar 2016	Apr 2016 to Mar 2017	Apr 2017 to Mar 2018	60 month trend	Average annual percentage change
Murder	4	2	3	0	1	Not Calculated *	**
Assault - domestic violence related	655	743	676	712	634	Stable	**
Assault - non- domestic violence related	1056	1125	1046	1147	1055	Stable	**
Sexual assault	122	152	126	158	186	Up	11.1%
Indecent assault, act of indecency and other sexual offences	188	182	178	230	250	Up	7.4%
Robbery without a weapon	62	43	37	49	30	Stable	**
Robbery with a firearm	10	10	4	10	4	Not Calculated *	**
Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	59	47	32	36	34	Down	-12.9%
Break and enter - dwelling	1019	768	893	893	994	Stable	**
Break and enter - non-dwelling	513	410	338	323	404	Down	-5.8%
Motor vehicle theft	474	387	415	485	505	Stable	**

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Steal from motor vehicle	1629	1443	1832	2089	2116	Up	6.8%
Steal from retail store	705	629	701	754	901	Up	6.3%
Steal from dwelling	686	705	689	723	765	Up	2.8%
Steal from person	240	194	190	167	164	Down	-9.1%
Fraud	1170	1210	1446	1563	1641	Up	8.8%
Malicious damage to property	2174	1906	1818	2199	2213	Stable	**

^{*} A trend is not calculated if at least one 12-month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents. ** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

From the table, the following crimes have decreased:

- Break and enter, non-dwelling: decreased by -5.8%
- Robbery with a weapon not a firearm: decreased -12.9%
- Steal from person: decreased -9.1%
- Malicious damage to property: decreased by 5.4%

The following crimes have increased:

- Sexual Assault: increase11.1%
- Indecent assault: increase 7.4%
- Steal from retail store: increased 6.3%
- Fraud: increased by 8.8%
- Steal from motor vehicle: increased 6.8%

BOCSAR provides crime Hotspot maps online to identify key areas in an LGA where crime occurs. Hotspot maps are available for calendar years starting from 2006. The coloured areas on the hotspot maps indicate:

Not shaded No Hotspot

Yellow Low-density hotspot Orange Medium density hotspot Red High density hotspot

For more information on hotspot maps please refer to the BOCSAR website and read the 'Understanding crime hotspot maps' publication.¹

Generally, the hotspot maps for the period April 2017 to March 2018 indicate most crime is at a high density with steal from person and robbery excluded in or around the proposed mixed development. Crimes mostly associated with domesticity displayed a number of distinct areas of spots with one significant hotspot near the premises of 'assault-domestic violence related to the east in and around the central business district area'.

¹ http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/bocsar/bocsar crime stats/bocsar glossary.html

Crimes which lacked a specific personal or physical target also displayed a number of distinct areas of spots but with four significant hotspots including 'malicious damage (including graffiti'), 'break and enter non-dwelling', 'steal from motor vehicle' and 'motor vehicle theft'. The crimes which due to their nature implicate a specific person or target displayed several significant but clearly separate hotspots included, 'break & enter non-dwelling' and 'malicious damage'.

While these maps can provide an overview of the spatial and temporal distribution of crime for the Newcastle LGA, it is important to recognise that these maps do not present a perfect picture of crime in the area. Incidents occurring in landmarks that cover a large area, for example parks and schools, are 'geocoded' to the geographic center of the landmark. In addition, when the location of a crime is not recorded accurately by police the incident is not represented on these crime maps.

These crime maps also do not include crimes that are not reported to the police. As much of the crime in the area, especially around the public housing sites, goes unreported, previous studies of crime in the area have relied on interviews and surveys to supplement data.² Despite this, findings from this study indicated that the survey data and fear mapping exercises generally corresponded with hot spots identified by mapped police crime data.3

The following table provides an extract of BOCSAR's comparative ranking system for the NSW LGAs for Crime.

Table 2 – Rankings of Selected Crime Categories for Newcastle LGA 2013-2017⁴

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Assault – non domestic	29	18	16	12	19
Assault - domestic	51	51	53	48	56
Break and enter – non-dwelling	38	47	44	63	30
Motor vehicle theft	9	31	25	11	10
Robbery	8	14	7	5	17
Steal from person	5	7	6	5	3
Steal from motor vehicle	7	16	7	5	2

While there is considerable controversy as to what contributes to individual fear of crime and what can be done to reduce such fears, the openness of the car park, lighting, the sightlines through the site and the surveillance provided by the activation of the area, all provide the potential to address perceptions or fear of crime

As with the identified crime types in the area the offences that will have the most impact on the facility are stable or increasing up to 11%. It is nonetheless important that any new refurbishment takes precautions and incorporates design features that will contribute to a further reduction in such offence types and not include anything that may encourage or enable such activity to take place. Apart from physical design features, such as access control, it is important to consider other strategies, for example educating

² Judd, B., Samuels, R. and Barton, J., 2001, The Effectiveness of Strategies for Crime reduction in Areas of Public Housing Concentration, The Social City, UNSW-UWS AHURI Research Centre.

⁴ Local Government Area Ranking Tool accessed at: http://bocd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/bocd/cmd/ranking/Process

clients and staff about how to use the car park safely and what to do if they notice suspicious behaviour.

4. Consultation

Newcastle Police Local Area Command Senior Constable Jeff Milton Crime Prevention Officer

Discussions with Senior Constable Milton provide context to the data obtain from the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research Crime Hotspot Maps and Crime Data with an up to date snapshot of crime in and around the Wests Site. McDonalds through to Marketown shopping centre is a crime hotspot for assaults and anti-social behaviour. It should also be noted that the Policy Clinic is located on the corner of Hunter and Steel Streets. There is general concern for steal from motor vehicle in the area which shouldn't be a major concern if the underground car park is well controlled and covered by closed circuit television (CCTV). This type of security measures will also assist in protecting resident's personal storage in car park areas.

Generally, there is concern in aged care facilities ranging from the John Hunter Hospital to private dwellings that organised crime groups are accessing these areas to steal personal items such as handbags and wallets to obtain access to personal data to commit varying fraud offences. There is also evidence of offenders gaining access to mailboxes to obtain the same information. Jeff suggests that's mailbox areas need to be secured or at a minimum good lobby security (swipe carded) with enough CCTV to gain evidence in the event of reported incidents.

Newcastle City Council Lisa Davis

Corporate and Community Planning, Strategy and Engagement

Discussions with Lisa Davis supported the comments from Senior Constable Milton. Motor vehicle theft and anti-social behaviour are of concern in the area. Youth crime during both day and night are also a concern particularly for older members of the public. There is migration of patrons between licensed premises generally causing through traffic and vandalism concerns. Walls need to be constructed of robust materials and ensuring over the long term they looked loved and well presented. Anti-graffiti material should be used and not be a blank canvas. There has also been several complaints received from residents throughout the area, not just around licensed premises in regard to motor vehicle activity and anti-social behaviour. Lisa further commented on the need to protect mail and access control on the car park area.

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5. Crime Type Analysis

Each aspect of the site is likely to be accompanied by particular crime risks, by virtue of the function and purpose of the space/area/structure. The following provides a brief analysis of the particular crimes most likely to be associated with or linked to the particular areas/facilities of the site:

Commercial

The nature of a commercial type outlet (Medical, Cafe and Pharmacy) will greatly affect the nature of the attendant crime risks. Any business with substantial cash takings is at risk of robbery, while organisations that handle drugs and credit card facilities are prone to fraudulent activities.

Responsibilities for management of internal workspace, cash handling and staff training, which are all relevant factors in seeking to prevent crime in commercial premises, will be the responsibility of the various owners/managers.

The delineation of where it is appropriate for staff to be within the complex is also an important factor that must be considered.

Private and Semi-Private Space

The private (residents) and shared space (walkways and carparks) will act to draw people through the site. If these areas are perceived to provide access to cash (wallets and handbags accessible) there is the potential for the risk of robbery and fraudulent activities. If vehicles are not secured or items left in vehicles are easy to identify, then these areas may be prone to theft from motor vehicle or malicious damage.

Responsibilities for management of internal workspace, cash handling and staff training, which are all relevant factors in seeking to prevent crime in commercial/outdoor areas of premises, will be the responsibility of the manager/licensee. Semi-private space, due to ease of accessibility, is often prone to malicious damage to property (graffiti and damage to buildings, fixtures and vegetation) and can be a site for anti-social behaviour. Poorly designed and managed semi-private space can become contested sites resulting in conflict between different users.

The design, lighting and landscape gardening all contribute to the safety of semi-private spaces. Avoidance of concealment spots, promotion of surveillance and guardianship, and use of building materials to specifically prevent malicious damage are important considerations in the design of the public realm. The site and landscaping plans demonstrate that there is good surveillance of public areas and few blank spaces. Viewing aids such as mirrors should be considered to limit potential blind spots located at walkway, stairs, lifts and where pedestrians enter the site.

Consideration for the movement of people through the space after the closure of the dining areas and auditorium will be a key issue to consider. As unsupervised semi-private spaces have the potential for drug use⁵ and may increase the potential for damage to the property, supplements for the guardianship provided by the increased activity that is generated when these areas are operating should be considered.

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⁵ Atlas, R., 2008, 21st Century Security and CPTED: Designing for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Crime Prevention, CRC Press, Florida, pp. 359.

In addition to the analysis of crime data presented in a previous section, it is also relevant to analyse and project the most likely crime issues based on the specific function and location of the proposed refurbishment. Crime issues for a registered club located in a built-up area, with residential dwellings backing onto the car park and significant steal of and steal from motor vehicle incidents in the area pose more concerns than a simple residential dwelling refurbishment or other locations. A general understanding of this context, criminal behaviour and the literature on crime in similar facilities/locations does highlight particular crimes and criminal modes of operation. These areas of concern have been addressed in the club's Alcohol Security Management Plan.

Aged Care

The Australian aged care system is generally considered by stakeholders and international peers as providing high quality services. Recently, however, there have been a number of examples in the media of where some providers in the aged care sector providing poor care and failing to respond to the needs of consumers, resulting in a series of inquiries into the quality of care provided in our residential aged care facilities (RACF).

More than half of all people in permanent residential aged care have a diagnosis of dementia,1 and as the peak body representing the more than 425,000 Australians living with dementia and the estimated 1.2 million Australians involved in their care, the quality of care in RACF is an issue that has long been the subject of our advocacy. As a result of this a number of recommendations have been made including:

- Current mandatory reporting requirements should be extended to include all assaults, including assaults perpetrated by a person with a cognitive impairment.
- All direct care workers in both residential and community aged care should be required to undertake more extensive background checks analogous to Working with Children Checks.
- Mandatory reporting of physical and sexual abuse should apply to all aged care services, whether in receipt of Commonwealth funding or otherwise.
- All staff in residential aged care facilities should receive high quality training in dementia care, including a social model of care and alternatives to physical and chemical restraint.
- Ensure quality and safety in residential aged care, funding arrangements should support appropriate staffing levels and skill mix. ⁶

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)'s ninth annual targeting scams report which notes that more than 200,000 scam reports were submitted to the ACCC, Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) and other federal and state-based Government agencies in 2017, with a reported loss totalling \$340 million.

As well as noting a \$40 million increase in reported losses from the previous year, the report also shows that investment scams were most common, with Australians aged 55-64 reporting the highest amount of losses, and those over 65 lodging the highest number of reports. ⁷

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⁶ Dementia Australia, 2018. Inquiry into the Quality of Care in Residential Aged Care Facilities in Australia

⁷ Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2018. Targeting Scams, p2.

All staff members who are reasonably likely to have access to care recipients, whether supervised or unsupervised; and volunteers who have unsupervised access to care recipients to have Police certificates of not more than three years old ⁸

Elderly Abuse

A specific issue with a criminal aspect relevant to this facility is the occurrence of elderly abuse. Elderly abuse is recognised as a prominent and serious problem in many societies, and includes physical, psychological/emotional, sexual and financial abuse from family or staff working with elderly people (World Health Organization, 2007). Due to the vulnerable and sometimes isolated predicament of the elderly, and relative greater power of caregivers and family, it is often suggested that elder abuse can remain hidden and difficult to detect. The potential for crime related to elder abuse, and the difficulty in identifying such abuse, warrants that these issues are addressed in the design and management of the development.

A report released by the Department of Health shows that the number of assaults reported in aged care homes jumped by 10 per cent. Unlike elder abuse in the community, 92 per cent of which is perpetrated by family members, assaults in aged care are perpetrated predominantly by staff and other residents. With increased longevity and a growing older population, it is time we sat up and took notice.

Whilst there are mandatory reporting obligations for suspected incidences in residential aged care, the low rate of prosecutions means that many perpetrators get away with such behaviour – often being shunted on to other facilities or "counselled" and then allowed to return to work.

In managing the risk of residents being victims of elder abuse at the facility it is recommended that the following design and management strategies are considered.

- Maximise contact between residents, and between residents and staff, in the facility. This has been facilitated in the development through grouping residential units within the facility but also needs to be supported by operational procedures and programming
- Ensure residents and staff are aware of what constitutes elder abuse and how they go about making a compliant and reporting abuse

Resident disputes and assault

Resident disputes and assault, while possible not as large a criminal problem in the proposed facility as in some communities, is an area requiring specific consideration. Locating a large number of residential units in close vicinity as well as shared facilities creates the potential for disputes between residents that in some cases could lead to criminal offences (e.g. assault, malicious damage).

If people are not well connected and able to develop positive social relationships with others in the facility it is likely that the associated anxiety may lead to suspicion and the increase the likelihood of disputes. An additional factor possibly related to the risk

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⁸ Aged Care Quality and Compliance Group, 2014

of disputes and violence in the proposed facility is that some residents may have or be developing dementia. Aggression, agitation and disordered thinking can be symptoms of some forms dementia, and as such if not managed, could increase the potential for conflict and violence.

In managing the risk of resident disputes and assault at the facility it is recommended that the following design and management strategies are considered.

- Facilitate casual and programmed interactions between residents to foster positive relationships. The design of the facility including residential clusters interspersed with clubhouses, shared activity spaces and one primary and centrally located community centre should facilitate such interaction
- Provision of adequate and diverse activity programming which appeals to the interests of a variety of residents
- Adequate health and support services for residents, particularly in relation to the identification and treatment dementia related illness

Fear of Crime

The literature identifies that fear of crime and safety concerns are often a more prominent issue among the elderly. While the elderly often have greater fears of crime, in comparison to other age cohorts in the community, they are often less likely to be actual victims of crime.

Managing and facilitating the elderly feeling safe is, however, very important to the well-being and functioning of residents of such facilities and needs to be considered in the design and operation of the facility.

A factor that can increase fears of crime among the elderly is anxiety related to perceived isolation and dislocation from the community. People are more likely to be fearful when they do not feel part of a community and do not have connections with family, friend and what is occurring in the broader community.

In managing residents' perceptions of safety and fears of crime at the facility it is recommended that the following design and management strategies are considered.

- Ensure that procedures and facilities are adequate and encourage visits from family, friends and community
- While it is important that the territory of the facility is well defined, it is important that the facility is designed so that it is part of the broader community. Use of large security type fencing could engender a fortress mentality, increasing residents' feelings of isolation from the community and increase fears of crime. Such security measures should only be used if necessary.
- Develop procedures for managing and communicating any strategies related to crime prevention to engender feelings of safety. Mange information so to limit the potential for crime events to be exaggerated out of proportion within facility.

Residential

Residential facilities provide the context for a wide diversity of crimes, many of which are not particularly amenable to physical design treatments. Violence (including domestic violence), sexual assault, child abuse and other frequently familial-based offences are most often committed in private residences. Despite the significant costs

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(both physical and psychological) of these offences, they are not especially amenable to design treatments.⁹

Even though there are difficulties in addressing these crime types, property-related offences (including break, enter and steal and malicious damage) are very much linked to residential premises and can be minimised through good design. Designs that promote guardianship and surveillance, minimise easy entry to upper floors, promote neighbour interaction and identification, utilise access control techniques, remove excuses for loitering of illegitimate users, and which use damage resistant materials all contribute to minimising potential offending. With the inclusion of signage to assist with resident's wayfinding, the site plans reveal that many of these principles have been incorporated into this development.

Theft Offences

Due to the location and population characteristics of the licensed venue it is most likely that the greatest risk of theft offences will be from offenders outside of the area who will need to drive cars to the facility. Theft offences may include break and enter dwelling, steal motor vehicle and steal from motor vehicle.

The primary mode of operation of offenders in theft offences would likely depend on whether the facility has public vehicular access into the facility. If vehicular access is restricted, then offenders will likely enter the facility on foot from the various adjoining roads. The extent to which theft offences could become a problem in the facility will likely depend on offenders' perceptions and experiences of risk of getting caught in the facility. If offenders successfully conduct theft offences, and feel they are unlikely to get caught, then they are more likely to target the facility.

In managing the risk of theft at the facility it is recommended that the following design and management strategies are considered.

- Use of CCTV monitoring of vehicular traffic into the facility.
- Provision of adequate street lighting on the street frontage/boundary of the facility to facilitate the perception of an active frontage and increasing capacity for surveillance and detection of offenders.
- Ensure that all staff are aware of the need to, and the method for, reporting suspicious behaviour to facility security.

Alcohol Related Crime

Alcohol related crime in the Newcastle area has been the focus of many studies, legal disputes and strategy development. All licensees and their staff must proactively manage the sale and supply of alcohol. The growing push to extend our night-time trade to increase business and service opportunities also provides additional risks.

Other features of the night-time economy have also been identified as causes of excessive or otherwise problematic consumption, in particular, the presence of youth orientated 'vertical drinking' establishments where drinking is an end in itself rather than an accompaniment to other activities, such as having a meal while seated at a table.

⁹ Sutton, A., Cherney, A. and White, R., 2008, *Crime Prevention: Principles, Perspectives and Practices*, Cambridge University Press, Sydney, pp. 57.

Specific factors that have been linked to a higher likelihood of aggression in public drinking settings include:

- Crowding.
- Poor bar layout and traffic flow.
- Inadequate seating or inconvenient bar access.
- Dim lighting, noise, poor ventilation or unclean conditions.
- Discount drinks and promotions that encourage heavy drinking (e.g. 'happy hours').
- Lack of availability of food.
- A 'permissive' environment that turns a blind eye to anti-social behaviour.
- Patrons with a history of aggression and who binge drink.
- Bar workers who don't practice responsible service of alcohol.
- Aggression/intimidation by doormen and bouncers.

These areas of concern have been addressed in the club's Alcohol Security Management Plan.

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6. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Analysis

There are numerous elements to a comprehensive CPTED analysis, involving broad or macro considerations moving to more narrow and micro considerations. For example, at the macro level, ensuring that the whole site operates effectively will be critical to preventing crime.

Locations that do not work effectively in a cohesive way are more prone to high crime. At the micro level, decisions about materials used for fences and access control techniques for the administration and learning centre properties will have implications for the prevention of crime.

Surveillance

Surveillance simply relates to others being able to see what is happening in a location. Lighting, shrubbery and foliage, buildings and other installations can promote or hinder surveillance. Creation of inviting spaces, installation of windows, lighting, deployment of guards and providing clear sightlines promote surveillance. CCTV and other electronic means can also be used for surveillance.

Based on the plans reviewed by CHD, it is apparent that the following design features promote surveillance:

- The use of limited entrances to the development provides increased natural surveillance of residents and occupants, and limits traffic flow throughout the development.
- The placement of buildings to reduce concealment opportunities such as alcoves or entrapment areas.
- Buildings have been set back from the roadway to provide a buffer area between public and private space.
- Buildings have been designed to avoid blind corners.
- Balconies and windows have been positioned to increase surveillance of the surrounding are in particular the through site link.

Consideration should also be given to the following throughout construction and completion of the refurbishment:

- Supplement casual surveillance of the open space in the facility.
- CCTV be used to monitor the Lobby of each building to reduce isolation opportunities.
- CCTV used to monitor access to car park and elevators.
- Mirrors to be installed near lifts to reduce blinds spots.

Lighting and Technical Supervision

Effective lighting contributes to public safety by improving visibility, surveillance and reducing fear whilst increasing the opportunities to detect offenders. While not specifically relevant to the existing plans, consideration should be given to the following principles/design features:

 Consideration should be given to ensuring the lux levels of lighting outside the facility and in the car parks to a higher level than the Australian Standards (AS

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1158). As there is a great deal of fear of crime at night that exists within the area, lighting should be above the standards to promote feelings of safety and enhance vision.

- Lighting will flow throughout the development and will be increased around door entrances and consideration should be given to minimising areas with glare pools.
- Signs indicating entrances, exits and emergency equipment around the facility will need to be illuminated and free from shrubbery.
- Areas that are monitored by CCTV cameras are complemented by appropriate luminous levels.
- Materials and fixtures are vandal resistant.

Landscaping

Promoting natural surveillance and guardianship are fundamental considerations for landscape designs. Based on the plans reviewed by CHD, it is apparent that the following landscaping features have been considered:

- Clear and open sightlines are provided throughout the development.
- There are no pathways around the facility that are obstructed by vegetation.
- All walls and severe grades have been reduced to increase vision.

Consideration should also be given to the following throughout construction and completion of landscaping:

- Landscaping in the public domain will be maintained in accordance with CPTED principles (shrubbery kept below 0.7 metres and when grown foliage above 1.8 metres. Placement of plants to prevent providing cover or access for criminal activity.
- Development of a vegetation maintenance program.

Access Control

The movement of people can be greatly affected by physical and symbolic barriers. Creating a small number of entrances, for example, increases opportunities for surveillance and reduces anonymity of visitors. Erecting fences and barriers, using landscaping techniques to encourage use of particular areas and biometric access measures are all examples of access control. Based on the plans reviewed by CHD, it is apparent that the following access control measures have been adopted:

- There is only one vehicle entrance into the basement car park via King Street.
- There are limited pathways to and from the open areas.
- Other building entries, pick up and drop off points will be well lit and generally visible from upper level units / public domain.
- Controlled access to storage or garbage areas.
- Access to the residential units is separate from communal and retail areas.
- There are no joint balconies throughout the construction.
- Secured letter boxes and provide coverage with CCTV.
- There is planted edges and screening between private and communal terrace.
- Secure access to independent living court yard.

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Furthermore, consideration might be given to the following features during the building phase of the refurbishment:

- Self-closing doors should be fitted to each Lobby to reduce burglary. If this
 method is going to be adopted consideration should be given to appropriate
 swipe-card or password systems. Key retrieval procedures should also be
 developed in the case of residents locking themselves out of their own residence.
- Barriers are designed carefully, of high quality, and are appropriate to their context.
- Using varied actual and symbolic barriers to define private, semi private and public areas such as low-level planter boxes, signage and access control mechanisms (chains etc) will be used.
- Bollards are included in access doorways on ground level access doors to discourage vehicle-enhanced break-ins.
- Plant and equipment areas to be secured with lock and master key system.
- Swipe cards be used to activate elevators and only allow access to appropriate floors.
- Fitting convex type mirrors inside of vehicle access gates as the driver can view the area behind him/her to see if any person/s has followed them through the open gate if using the 24 hour access card option.
- Doors to be secured by deadlocks; and windows to be fitted with fixed pane glass/appropriate locking devices
- Barriers are designed carefully, of high quality, and are appropriate to their context.
- Access is appropriate for children, seniors and people with a disability.
- Appropriate safes to be installed if S8 drugs or blister packs are to be stored with appropriates CCTV and swipe access on all clean utility rooms.
- Duress alarms to be installed in high risk areas.

Territorial Reinforcement

Simple cues in the built environment inform people about the nature of the environments that they routinely pass through and visit. A sign can denote movement from public to private space; conditions of entry can encourage particular behaviour and active maintenance can discourage illegal activities. Territorial reinforcement can be promoted by these and other measures. Based on the plans reviewed by CHD, it is apparent that the following territorial reinforcement measures have been adopted:

- Clear delineation between private and semi-private space.
- Car park clearly defines semi-private space.
- Entrances are in prominent positions.
- There are clear land ownership cues with include shrubbery, low fencing, etc.
- Retail and office space are located at street level, and residences on upper floors provide activity beyond office hours.

Consideration might be given to the following issues during construction and post-occupancy:

• Use of appropriate signage throughout the development to reduce confusion amongst staff and patrons to reduce opportunities for excuses by intruders. This will include signage to indicate parking requirements and direction of travel.

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- Use of international symbols should be considered as these are more easily identified by people with an intellectual disability and also by people who have English as their second language.
- It is possible that some patrons may have limited vision, disabilities or wear glasses. Consideration should have been given to making signage on doors, directional signs and information signs stronger and clearer.
- Signage to remind members and patrons to lock vehicles and not leave exposed valuables.
- Territorial responsibility for ownership should be achieved by educating residents via facilitation meetings and associated residential bulletins about the holistic responsibility of security.

Space Management

The ongoing maintenance of an area will send cues to potential offenders. If an area shows sign of damage and limited monitoring, then would-be offenders might be inclined to damage property or perpetrate crimes against the person, safe in the knowledge that they will not be apprehended. Maintaining property, listing conditions of entry, removing graffiti and repairing damage immediately, all contribute to effective space management. Such strategies are routinely enacted post completion of a refurbishment.

- Crime displacement should not be a major concern as the land is currently utilised.
- The activities that the site supports are compatible and balanced.
- Transport already operates around the site utilising taxis and local public transport. Bus time table could be made available in the foyer.

Consideration will need to be given to the following issues post-construction:

- Street furniture needs to be designed to be used by the target group. Well maintained and user-friendly furniture will encourage regular use along with increased surveillance of the area. This furniture will be designed to suit the needs of all users and will also need to be of strong construction using good surfaces which are non-corrodible. It should be free from projecting or easily removable parts and be fixed to the ground with hidden fastenings to reduce removal.
- Ground level furniture such as guard rails, seats or bins should be robust, durable
 and secured into the ground at reasonable depths or by concrete base bolts to
 avoid easy removal.
- Furniture that is not fixed will be constructed of heavy material to reduce its ability to be moved easily.
- Anti-graffiti coatings should be applied to vulnerable areas and complement rapid turnaround maintenance programs and fault reporting systems.
- A rapid maintenance program should be developed, documented and implemented to ensure site cleanliness, repair vandalism (graffiti) or damage occasioned to signs, building or furniture and monitor lighting.

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- Shrubs, trees and areas must be maintained at regular intervals to provide access to occupants. If areas are inviting, they will promote use which increases natural guardianship and surveillance.
- Garbage bins should be fitted in public areas that are well supervised to encourage site tidiness.
- Maintenance staff are trained to identify and report potential problems immediately.
- Responsibility for all tasks and maintenance clearly defined and understood.
- Air conditioning plants, meter boxes and other service points are mounted within a secure building or enclosure for protection.
- Surveillance cameras are recorded and monitored as required.
- Appropriate night-time uses are encouraged.
- Users, businesses and residents are involved in management.
- Alliances, partnerships, and information sharing is encouraged between all stakeholders.
- Maintenance staff are trained to identify and report potential problems immediately.
- Regular audits of CPTED principles are conducted.
- Regular reviews into the circumstances of crime are conducted to identify changing or new CPTED problems, and the effectiveness of management systems in operation and opportunities for improvements.

7. Conclusion

Based on the analyses undertaken, there does not appear to be any likelihood that the proposed refurbishment will adversely affect crime levels in the area. On the contrary, from analysis of the site plans, there are a number of features that will have a salutary impact on the area, including:

- The increased population density associated with the mixed-used development will increase the activation of the area during the day.
- The development will maximise surveillance and activity throughout the day and will increase the number residents and pedestrian traffic. This diverse temporal and functional activity in and around the site will stimulate activity and surveillance, which will help to minimise crime and reduce perceptions or fear of crime.

Beyond these positive impacts on the surrounding area, there are also features of the proposed refurbishment which reflect CPTED principles and address potential crime risks. These include:

- The proposed mixed-development has clear legibility and clear transition from private to semi-private space. The semi-private areas are distinct from public space which helps promote territoriality.
- Clear sightlines through the site and good visibility into the site generally.
- No signs of entrapment spots and limited long blank walls that would contribute to crime in the area.

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- The proposed development has clear legibility and clear transition from public to
 private space. Residential accommodation is clearly distinct from commercial /
 retail space, with clear and specific entrance points to residential accommodation
 providing good access control. Moreover, the public areas are distinct from the
 privately-owned spaces, which help promote territoriality.
- There are clear sightlines through the public domain and good visibility into the site generally. The wide public thoroughfares through the site will draw people in and through the site. The surveillance into these areas from the residential accommodation, the clear sightlines and the considerable width of the public spaces will promote surveillance and safety.
- The site and landscaping plans demonstrate that there is good surveillance of public areas, no sights of entrapment spots and few blank spaces.
- Car park plans indicate that there will be distinct areas for residential and retail parking. The separation of these areas reduces potential excuse making for would-be offenders in the area.

While it is anticipated that these benefits will be derived from this refurbishment there are some issues that might be considered throughout including:

- Given the existing steal of and steal from motor vehicle offences in the area, consideration might be given to erecting suitable signage around the development reminding car owners to secure their vehicles.
- Lighting in and around the development needs to be carefully planned such that it exceeds the AS 1158, thus increasing surveillance and promoting feelings of safety.
- Carefully planned landscaping to ensure plants and foliage to not obstruct sightlines and lighting.
- Use of signage and other physical cues to help people find their way around the facility easily.
- Development of space management strategies to include ongoing site maintenance, landscaping, graffiti removal etc.

Overall, it is concluded that the proposed development has the potential to positively contribute to the Newcastle West area. The site plans, the crime data analysis and interviews with relevant stakeholders suggest that there are generally no major pre-existing crime problems in the immediate area and the proposed plans for the site are likely to increase activity, promote surveillance and provide good sightlines throughout the development.

Furthermore, it is suggested that the proposed development has the potential to contribute towards crime reduction and help create a positive image of the area, thus serving the additional purpose of reducing fear of crime in the area.

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Appendix 1: Site Overview



Figure 1: Aerial View of Wests Newcastle

Appendix 2: Profiles of Project Team

Michael (Mick) Huggett - Principal

Mick worked for the NSW Police Force for 15 years (including Newcastle police station) prior to becoming a Director of CHD in 2005. In his time with the NSW Police Force, Mick worked as a Youth Liaison Officer, Education and Development Officer and a Licensing Coordinator.

Mick's qualifications include a Bachelor of Adult Education, Advanced Diploma Security Risk Management, Diploma Training and Assessment and the NSW Police Safer by Design Training program. Mick has extensive experience with liquor licensing and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) assessments. Mick has worked on a number of crime and security risk assessments since joining CHD.

Daniel Kruit – Consultant

Daniel brings 12 years of experience in the security industry together with a broad set of skills and knowledge, having held operational, administrative and consultancy positions in varied operational and managerial roles. He holds tertiary qualifications in Business (Management), Security (Risk) Management and Accounting.

Daniel spent 5 years as the Assistant Manager of an industry leading Registered Training Organisation (RTO) where he was responsible for the development and implementation of training programs and administrative systems. He was an active member of the Institute of Security Executives Training Special Working Committee, which led to positions on the Security Industry Registry RTO Consultative Group and the NSW Security Licensing Courses Project Management Committee, responsible for the National Security Training Package Upgrade and its integration into a state-wide licensing system.

In his role as a Compliance Manager, he has also assisted companies in obtaining and maintaining certification against International and Australian Standards in Quality, Safety and Sustainability. Daniel has a broad understanding of the industry including Electronic Security & Communications Technologies and is a licensed Risk Manager and Consultant.

Sarah Eastlake-Smith - Consultant

Sarah completed her first project with CHD in 2008 after graduating with a Bachelor of Policing in 2005 from the University of Western Sydney, with Honours in 2007. Her honours thesis, entitled 'Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention: Determining the responsiveness of drivers towards driver-targeted motor vehicle theft prevention initiatives' has been used as the basis for a CHD Partners Crime Prevention Fact Sheet.


Sarah has conducted research about young people as victims of crime and is interested in how intelligence can be used to inform future actions in both the law enforcement and crime prevention areas. She is currently undertaking a Graduate Diploma of Criminal Intelligence at Charles Sturt University, focusing on cybercrime and alcohol-related violence.

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
Appendix 3: Hotspot Maps Newcastle LGA April 2017 to March 2018

Incidents of Assault (Non-domestic assault) from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018






Incidents of Assault (Domestic assault) from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018





Incidents of Robbery from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018






Incidents of Malicious damage to property from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018






Incidents of Theft (Break & enter dwelling) from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018






Incidents of Theft (Break & enter non-dwelling) from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018






Incidents of Theft (Motor vehicle theft) from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018





Incidents of Theft (Steal from motor vehicle) from Apr 2017 to Mar 2018









Crime Trends Tool

Table 1. Recorded incidents of selected offences in the Newcastle Local Government Area Annual Totals and 60 month trend from April 2013 to March 2018

Offence	Apr 2013 to Mar 2014	Apr 2014 to Mar 2015	Apr 2015 to Mar 2016	Apr 2016 to Mar 2017	Apr 2017 to Mar 2018	Trend	Avg. annual % change
Murder	4	2	3	0	1	Not Calculated *	**
Assault - domestic violence related	655	743	676	712	634	Stable	**
Assault - non-domestic violence related	1056	1125	1046	1147	1055	Stable	**
Sexual assault	122	152	126	158	186	Up	11.1%
Indecent assault, act of indecency and other sexual offences	188	182	178	230	250	Up	7.4%
Robbery without a weapon	62	43	37	49	30	Stable	**
Robbery with a firearm	10	10	4	10	4	Not Calculated *	**
Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	59	47	32	36	34	Down	-12.9%
Break and enter - dwelling	1019	768	893	893	994	Stable	**
Break and enter - non-dwelling	513	410	338	323	404	Down	-5.8%
Motor vehicle theft	474	387	415	485	505	Stable	**
Steal from motor vehicle	1629	1443	1832	2089	2116	Up	6.8%
Steal from retail store	705	629	701	754	901	Up	6.3%
Steal from dwelling	686	705	689	723	765	Up	2.8%

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

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Crime Trends Tool

Continued. Offence	Apr 2013 to Mar 2014	Apr 2014 to Mar 2015	Apr 2015 to Mar 2016	Apr 2016 to Mar 2017	Apr 2017 to Mar 2018	Trend	Avg. annual % change
Steal from person	240	194	190	167	164	Down	-9.1%
Fraud	1170	1210	1446	1563	1641	Up	8.8%
Malicious damage to property	2174	1906	1818	2199	2213	Stable	**

^{*} A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

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NSW Justice

^{**} No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.



Crime Trends Tool Continued.

Table 2. Recorded criminal incidents of selected offences in the Newcastle Local Government Area by month

Month/Year	Murder	Assault - domestic violence related	Assault - non-domestic violence related	Sexual assault	Indecent assault, act of indecency and other sexual offences	Robbery without a weapon	Robbery with a firearm	Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	Break and enter - dwelling	Break and enter - non-dwelling	Motor vehicle theft	Steal from motor vehicle
Apr 2013	0	49	91	10	20	10	1	1	84	54	48	200
May 2013	0	45	93	6	20	9	2	5	90	51	47	149
Jun 2013	0	45	98	12	22	6	0	13	98	45	50	184
Jul 2013	0	52	84	12	15	8	1	3	106	49	40	125
Aug 2013	0	59	87	13	19	4	1	4	88	51	42	92
Sep 2013	1	45	94	16	14	6	0	3	95	46	41	119
Oct 2013	1	54	83	12	13	1	1	6	116	45	44	130
Nov 2013	0	57	97	9	11	2	0	2	52	32	34	127
Dec 2013	0	54	66	6	8	0	0	7	88	43	36	128
Jan 2014	0	74	100	13	13	5	2	9	59	29	27	124
Feb 2014	1	48	67	6	12	7	0	4	70	40	34	128
Mar 2014	1	73	96	7	21	4	2	2	73	28	31	123
Apr 2014	1	51	89	9	12	1	4	4	84	29	30	104
May 2014	0	73	102	9	14	4	0	1	69	21	20	148
Jun 2014	0	60	84	32	20	2	0	6	40	42	31	124
Jul 2014	0	43	70	11	14	0	1	1	42	32	33	112
Aug 2014	0	54	85	14	20	1	0	4	52	37	41	106
Sep 2014	0	57	83	7	10	3	0	5	62	22	37	115

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

Your reference number is: 2018-941450-3. Important: Please quote this number when referring to this data query.





Crime Trends Tool Continued.

Month/Year	Murder	Assault - domestic violence related	Assault - non-domestic violence related	Sexual assault	Indecent assault, act of indecency and other sexual offences	Robbery without a weapon	Robbery with a firearm	Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	Break and enter - dwelling	Break and enter - non-dwelling	Motor vehicle theft	Steal from motor vehicle
Oct 2014	0	61	101	10	18	6	0	4	76	25	32	119
Nov 2014	0	75	97	9	20	2	0	2	64	29	35	112
Dec 2014	0	57	111	15	15	5	1	3	79	48	36	154
Jan 2015	0	67	106	9	18	6	1	4	76	42	36	105
Feb 2015	0	72	93	12	8	6	1	9	59	42	25	121
Mar 2015	1	73	104	15	13	7	2	4	65	41	31	123
Apr 2015	1	47	81	11	13	1	0	5	89	45	33	173
May 2015	0	46	87	7	13	2	0	2	75	43	26	132
Jun 2015	0	60	80	7	13	2	0	4	61	31	40	156
Jul 2015	1	49	75	8	14	0	0	4	60	18	40	131
Aug 2015	0	43	80	9	14	2	0	5	68	36	28	126
Sep 2015	0	67	71	3	14	4	0	2	65	27	34	125
Oct 2015	0	54	87	10	15	3	1	3	68	25	38	201
Nov 2015	0	56	84	13	26	3	2	1	96	23	40	178
Dec 2015	0	58	100	14	12	3	1	1	68	25	25	172
Jan 2016	0	71	97	13	8	3	0	2	107	21	44	140
Feb 2016	0	60	100	15	16	7	0	0	69	18	38	128
Mar 2016	1	65	104	16	20	7	0	3	67	26	29	170
Apr 2016	0	55	86	22	26	6	2	3	51	28	40	167
May 2016	0	59	108	20	20	1	1	2	79	24	47	148

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

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Crime Trends Tool Continued.

Month/Year	Murder	Assault - domestic violence related	Assault - non-domestic violence related	Sexual assault	Indecent assault, act of indecency and other sexual offences	Robbery without a weapon	Robbery with a firearm	Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	Break and enter - dwelling	Break and enter - non-dwelling	Motor vehicle theft	Steal from motor vehicle
Jun 2016	0	50	65	9	16	3	0	2	80	25	29	176
Jul 2016	0	50	96	9	13	10	1	4	76	29	47	174
Aug 2016	0	51	90	9	15	7	1	4	72	16	39	125
Sep 2016	0	55	88	7	14	3	0	2	87	26	38	142
Oct 2016	0	51	92	16	21	4	0	2	68	21	35	185
Nov 2016	0	79	92	16	17	2	0	2	94	31	37	196
Dec 2016	0	74	130	13	15	3	4	4	79	24	40	153
Jan 2017	0	87	91	8	17	4	0	5	64	36	46	151
Feb 2017	0	48	93	10	28	3	1	3	70	37	34	194
Mar 2017	0	53	116	19	28	3	0	3	73	26	53	278
Apr 2017	0	50	92	11	20	2	0	3	89	32	38	192
May 2017	0	45	79	19	35	1	0	2	101	36	47	190
Jun 2017	0	47	63	18	23	2	0	2	77	44	36	185
Jul 2017	0	53	80	14	20	2	1	1	74	39	26	98
Aug 2017	0	59	95	12	18	2	0	3	71	48	43	125
Sep 2017	0	50	97	15	29	4	0	1	68	31	47	195
Oct 2017	0	60	92	23	21	3	1	1	84	34	47	221
Nov 2017	0	60	102	20	18	1	1	5	96	36	45	178
Dec 2017	1	55	93	14	12	1	0	8	107	34	45	188
Jan 2018	0	51	89	12	17	5	0	3	103	35	53	222

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

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Crime Trends Tool Continued.

Month/Year	Murder	Assault - domestic violence related	Assault - non-domestic violence related	Sexual assault	Indecent assault, act of indecency and other sexual offences	Robbery without a weapon	Robbery with a firearm	Robbery with a weapon not a firearm	Break and enter - dwelling	Break and enter - non-dwelling	Motor vehicle theft	Steal from motor vehicle
Feb 2018	0	62	87	12	15	3	0	4	63	16	36	161
Mar 2018	0	42	86	16	22	4	1	1	61	19	42	161

Month/Year	Steal from retail store	Steal from dwelling	Steal from person	Fraud	Malicious damage to property
Apr 2013	52	64	15	93	215
May 2013	70	64	17	111	192
Jun 2013	95	53	21	98	189
Jul 2013	83	44	19	107	188
Aug 2013	68	61	33	81	167
Sep 2013	41	71	18	67	171
Oct 2013	45	63	25	57	179
Nov 2013	53	51	20	95	194
Dec 2013	54	49	20	134	177

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

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Crime Trends Tool Continued.

Month/Year	Steal from retail store	Steal from dwelling	Steal from person	Fraud	Malicious damage to property
Jan 2014	51	59	17	108	183
Feb 2014	43	55	16	109	156
Mar 2014	50	52	19	110	163
Apr 2014	53	50	19	78	117
May 2014	61	58	12	76	150
Jun 2014	58	53	12	106	139
Jul 2014	61	60	9	134	141
Aug 2014	59	52	15	64	148
Sep 2014	45	64	18	93	180
Oct 2014	54	54	40	57	156
Nov 2014	52	61	16	105	186
Dec 2014	49	66	7	119	173
Jan 2015	45	70	17	111	189
Feb 2015	54	61	18	142	158
Mar 2015	38	56	11	125	169
Apr 2015	39	55	9	125	134
May 2015	58	47	15	142	153
Jun 2015	62	52	16	103	146
Jul 2015	53	50	14	112	124
Aug 2015	66	50	10	97	136
Sep 2015	44	61	15	101	138
Oct 2015	62	79	20	126	159
Nov 2015	76	59	19	100	162
Dec 2015	72	55	18	167	162
Jan 2016	66	63	11	92	173
Feb 2016	58	60	23	109	142
Mar 2016	45	58	20	172	189

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

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Crime Trends Tool Continued.

Month/Year	Steal from retail store	Steal from dwelling	Steal from person	Fraud	Malicious damage to property
Apr 2016	80	46	17	125	166
May 2016	62	53	10	147	160
Jun 2016	64	67	12	144	200
Jul 2016	67	53	9	154	191
Aug 2016	76	55	19	123	186
Sep 2016	31	62	7	101	195
Oct 2016	52	68	15	91	180
Nov 2016	68	79	17	116	158
Dec 2016	59	56	14	104	201
Jan 2017	44	60	20	132	162
Feb 2017	76	54	11	143	165
Mar 2017	75	70	16	183	235
Apr 2017	68	67	14	136	178
May 2017	78	66	15	130	229
Jun 2017	70	67	14	180	203
Jul 2017	75	48	15	109	165
Aug 2017	73	56	14	135	215
Sep 2017	83	66	10	157	154
Oct 2017	71	62	15	117	209
Nov 2017	74	68	15	106	151
Dec 2017	67	65	17	110	173
Jan 2018	92	73	18	159	190
Feb 2018	67	58	8	156	157
Mar 2018	83	69	9	146	189

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

Your reference number is: 2018-941450-3. Important: Please quote this number when referring to this data query.

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